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the Rt. Hon. Lord Luce GCVO, DL to 
commemorate the long and 
distinguished career of Sir William 
Luce GBE, KCMG, DL (1907-1977) in 
the Middle East during the era of the 
transfer of power.  
 
Born in 1907, Sir William was 
educated at Clifton College and Christ's 
College Cambridge, where he read 
History and Modern Languages. 
Entering the Sudan Political Service in 
1930, he served in Berber, Darfur, Blue 
Nile and Equatoria Provinces and 
finally as Adviser to the Governor-
General on Constitutional and External 
Affairs in the immediate period leading 
to the Sudan's independence in 1956. 
He was later able to bring his many 
talents to other offices.  
 
He was Governor of Aden from 1956 to 1960. From 1961 until 1966 and again from 
1970 to 1972 he was intimately connected with the Gulf area, first as Political Resident, 
based in Bahrain and then recalled from retirement - as the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary's Personal Representative for Gulf Affairs.  
 
Sir William was held in the greatest respect and affection by the peoples of the Middle 
East, and among the many tributes paid to him by prominent Arab statesmen on his death 
in 1977 were:- „He served the Arab World with the same zeal and dedication as his own 
country' and 'He understood our problems and aspirations.'  
 
The object of the Fund is to support the study of those parts of the Arab world to which 
Sir William devoted his working life, to stimulate research, discussion and publication 
about them and to encourage collaboration and co-operation between institutions of 
learning, specialising in the places which aroused Sir William's own interest. An annual 
Sir William Luce Fellowship is tenable jointly in the University of Durham‟s Institute for 
Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies and Trevelyan College.  
 
 
 
 
 ii 
Durham Middle East Papers  
Sir William Luce Publication Series  
 
 
No. 1  Professor Bushra Babiker  
 Khartoum: Past, Present and the Prospects for the future 
 
No. 2 Professor Ahmad Sikainga  
 Organized Labor and Social Change in Contemporary Sudan  
 
No. 3 Dr Javad Nateghpour  
 The Cultural Dimensions of Anglo-Iranian Relations  
 
No. 4 Dr Robert Copaken  
 The Arab Oil Weapon of 1973-79 as a Double-Edged Sword: Its 
 Implications for Future Energy Security  
 
No. 5 Dr John Peterson  
 The Emergence of Post-Traditional Oman  
 
No. 6 Professor Gerd Nonneman  
 Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies: From Liberalisation to 
 Democratisation? A Comparative Perspective  
 
No. 7 Dr Steven Wright  
 Generational Change and Elite Driven Reforms in the Kingdom of 
 Bahrain: Opportunities and Challenges for Future Initiatives 
 
No. 8 Dr Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf 
 Ina Beasley: Her Perspectives on Women‟s Prospects in British Sudan 
 
 No. 9 Professor Peter Woodward 
 Sudan: Political Transitions Past and Present 
 
    No.10  Dr Leben Moro 
      Oil Development Induced Displacement in the Sudan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
Durham Middle East Papers 
Sir William Luce Publication Series 
 
 
 
 
************************************************ 
 
 
Oil Development Induced Displacement in the Sudan 
 
 
************************************************ 
 
by 
 
Leben Moro 
 
 
 
Sir William Luce Fellowship Paper No. 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
Sir William Luce Fellowship Paper No. 10 
Durham Middle East Papers No.  
ISSN 1476-4830  
September 2009  
 
The Durham Middle East Papers series covers all aspects of the economy, politics, 
social science, history, literature and languages of the Middle East. Authors are invited 
to submit papers to the Editorial Board for consideration for publication.  
 
The Sir William Luce Paper Series is a special edition of the Durham Middle East 
Papers.  
 
Series Editor: Dr Colin P Turner  
 
Editorial Board:  Dr Paul Luft 
   Dr Mehmet Asutay 
   Mr Mamtimyn Sunuodula 
   Dr Lorraine Holmes  
 
Published by:  Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies  
   Durham University  
   The Al-Qasimi Building  
   Elvet Hill Road  
   Durham DH1 3TU, UK  
   Tel: +44 (0)191 334 5680 | Fax: +44 (0)191 334 5661  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any 
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise (other than short extracts for the 
purpose of review), without the prior written permission of the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 
Durham University.  
 
© Leben Moro and Durham University 
 v 
Dr Leben Moro is a Southern Sudanese scholar currently based at the Centre for Peace 
and Development Studies, University of Juba, where he teaches graduate courses in 
Basic Refugee Problems and The Problems of Internal Displacement. He has worked 
with several international organisations, including World Vision International (WVI), 
International Relief and Development (IRD), European Coalition on Oil in Sudan 
((ECOS), Open Society Initiative in East Africa (OSIEA) and Skills for Southern 
Sudan. 
 
Dr Moro received his M.Sc. in Forced Migration and D.Phil. in Development Studies 
from the University of Oxford in 2004 and 2008 respectively.  He also holds degrees 
from the American University in Cairo and University of Juba.  His primary areas of 
research are development-induced displacement and resettlement, focusing on oil-
induced displacement in Sudan, and forced migration.  He has conducted fieldwork in 
the oil-bearing areas of Southern Sudan and among Sudanese refugees in Egypt, 
Uganda and Kenya.  Some of the findings of his studies appeared in the Journal of 
Refugee Studies (Oxford University), St Anthony’s International Review (Oxford 
University), Forced Migration Review (Oxford University), New Internationalist and 
Pambazuka News.  At the moment, he is working on a book on Sudan‟s oil and its 
impact on the indigenous population of Southern Sudan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
Oil Development Induced Displacement in Sudan 
Leben Nelson Moro 
Sir William Luce Fellow 2009 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------  1 
2. Pre-war Oil Activities and Rising Political Tensions--------------  2 
2.1. Oil discovery-------------------------------------------------------  2 
2.2. Chevron and local Dinka and Nuer---------------------------  3  
2.3. Oil disputes--------------------------------------------------------  5 
2.3.1. Renaming of oil areas----------------------------------------  5 
2.3.2. Secrecy and ambiguity---------------------------------------  5 
2.3.3. North-South border------------------------------------------  6 
2.3.4. Oil refinery----------------------------------------------------  7 
3. Wartime Oil Activities and Mass Displacement-------------------  8 
3.1. Chevron attacked and forced out------------------------------   8 
3.2. Oil flow-------------------------------------------------------------   10 
3.2.1. Pariang---------------------------------------------------------  13 
3.2.2. Heglig-----------------------------------------------------------  14 
3.2.3. Rubkona--------------------------------------------------------  15 
3.2.4. Melut------------------------------------------------------------  16 
4. Post-war Oil Activities and Ongoing Displacement----------------   17 
4.1. Land expropriation at Paloich----------------------------------  17 
4.2. Property destruction at Maker and Manyo-------------------   17 
4.3. Worsening North-South border disputes---------------------  18 
4.4. Environmental pollution----------------------------------------  18 
5. Conclusion------------------------------------------------------------------  19
- 1 - 
1.  Introduction 
Since the Anglo-Egyptian colonial epoch (1898-1956), development in Sudan has 
mainly been based on large-scale projects, such as the Gezira Irrigation Scheme, 
Rahad Irrigation Scheme, Jonglei Canal, oil exploitation, Merowe Dam and rain-fed 
mechanized agricultural schemes.  Without doubt, these projects, implemented in the 
name of the „national interest,‟ have benefited the country immensely.  Nonetheless, it 
is also true that they have been associated with conflicts and displacement as people 
who feel marginalized resort to arms against the state so as to secure their interests.  
This paper analyses the conflict and displacement linked to oil development in 
Southern Sudan, a region that suffered two long wars since the British and Egyptian 
colonial regime was ended in 1956 and Northern "Arab"
1
 and Muslim elites assumed 
power. 
 
The first war began a few months before independence and ended in 1972 with the 
signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement by the Anyanya rebel group and the 
government.  The second war broke out in 1983 and ceased in 2005, when the 
Southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the 
government concluded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  To a great 
extent, Southern Sudanese resumed fighting in 1983 so as to secure their interests in 
oil, which although developed in the name of the „national interest‟ serves mostly the 
interests of its main beneficiaries: “Ara” and Muslim elites and their supporters in the 
North.  The indigenous people of the oil-rich parts of the South bore the brunt of the 
war, which escalated since oil exports started 1999.  An estimated 204,500 people 
were internally displaced within Unity State from mid-1998 to February 2001.
2
  The 
UN reported that some 110,000-180,000 people had been displaced or re-displaced 
between October 2000 and February 2003 in the same region.
3
  In the first quarter of 
2002 alone, between 150,000 and 300,000 people were displaced.  Similarly, Upper 
Nile State suffered severe human displacement.  
 
The bitter experience of Sudan, however, is not unique.  Other low income, oil-rich 
countries, such as Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, had or continue to 
experience conflicts and displacement associated with the exploration and extraction 
of oil and other natural resources.
4
  Indeed, Ian Bannon and Paul Collier succinctly 
observed that „the presence of abundant primary commodities, especially in low-
income countries, exacerbates the risks of conflict and, if conflict does break out, 
tends to prolong it‟.5 
                                                 
 
1
 Most of the Northern Sudanese who identify themselves as “Arab” have Arab and African ancestry. 
“Arabs” form a large portion of the population of the North. The people of the South, which is nearly 
one-third of the area of the country, are entirely black Africans. 
2
 Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil and Human Rights, (New York, Human Rights Watch, 2003), 
 p. 416. 
3
 UNOCHA, „Sudan: Mid-Year Review‟, (New York and Geneva, United Nations). http:reliefweb.int/ 
4
 Denny, Charlotte, „Oil Firms Secretly Finance Crooked Regimes‟, The Guardian, 24 March 2004; 
Drohan, Madelaine Making a Kill: How and Why Corporations Use Armed Force to do Business, 
(Toronto, Tandom House, 2003); Frynas, J. George, „The Oil Boom in Equatorial Guinea‟, African 
Affairs, Vol.103, No.413, 2004, p.527-546. 
5
 Bannon, Ian and Collier, Paul, Natural Resources and Violent Conflicts, (Washington DC, The World 
Bank, 2003), p. ix. 
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It is, however, the case that exploitation of oil and other natural resources is not 
always associated with negative outcomes.  Indonesia achieved impressive economic 
growth during the 1970s and 1980s because of its massive oil and gas reserves.
6
  Oil-
rich African countries, including Angola and Sudan, have attracted significant foreign 
investments, fuelling spectacular economic growth.  However, the economic benefits 
are often concentrated in national capitals.
7
   For example, Sudan's capital, Khartoum, 
witnessed an impressive economic progress since oil exports began in 1999.  Other 
parts of the country, particularly the oil areas, have mostly known violence and 
displacement.     
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the discovery of oil by 
Chevron Oil Company and its repercussions for the local people in the oil areas and 
for the Addis Ababa Agreement. Section 3 deals with development of oil resources in 
the midst of the second war and the mass displacement of local people.  Section 4 
delves into the ongoing displacement after the war ended.  And the last section 
concludes.  
 
I collected much of the information for this paper in 2006 and early this year in Upper 
Nile and Unity States of Southern Sudan, where I held interviews with politicians, 
local leaders and ordinary people, oil workers, and aid workers.  Moreover, I 
consulted published works, newspapers articles and NGO reports that deal with oil 
issues.  In addition, I read materials in the Sudan Archive that tackle development in 
general and oil in particular.  
 
 
2.  Pre-war Oil Activities and Rising Political Tensions 
The discovery and development of oil in Southern Sudan during the Addis Ababa 
Agreement period (1972-1983) did not cause serious difficulties for the local Dinka 
and Nuer.  However, it led to serious tensions between Northern and Southern elites.  
As Peter Woodward pointed out, „[the] discovery of oil turned from dream to 
nightmare as politicians North and South wrangled over Chevron‟s discovery of the 
field near Bentiu‟.8 
 
 
2.1  Oil Discovery 
In 1974, Chevron was granted a licence to prospect for oil on 516,000km
2
 of territory 
in the South and South-western Sudan.  Four years later, it discovered oil in Abu 
Gabra and later made more discoveries.  By 1981, it had sunk 24 wells, of which 12 
were dry.
9
  The most promising finds were in Unity field, Bentiu district.  Chevron 
also explored for oil outside the area where the promising Unity field was situated in 
                                                 
 
6
 Rosser, Andrew, „Escaping the Resource Curse: The Case of Indonesia‟, Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, Vol.37, No.1, 2007, p.38-58. 
7
 Ferguson, James, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order, (Durham (N.C.), Duke 
University Press, 2006). 
8
 Woodward, Peter, The Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations, (London, 
I.B.Tauris, 1996), p.49. 
9
 Boulis, Nagi Saliem, „Exploration goes on‟, Sudanow, Vol.5, No.9, September 1981. 
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an area south of Bahr al Ghazal River, close to Bentiu town.  In 1981, it found oil in 
Adar Yel, located south of Melut town, which is about 120km northeast of Malakal 
town.  By April 1982, Chevron was reported to have completed the drilling of three 
exploratory wells in the Melut area.
10
  
 
Towards the end of 1980, the government awarded an area covering about 
170,000km
2
 in Blocks B and C lying south and adjacent to Chevron‟s concession to 
Total of France
11
.  Other partners in the joint production-sharing concession were 
International Energy Development, Kuwait Foreign Exploration Company, and the 
Sudanese state-owned General Petroleum Corporation.  
 
This progress in oil prospecting and development thrilled elites in the central 
government.  However, the local Dinka and Nuer inhabitants of the oil areas were not 
fully informed about the intentions of the foreigners scouring their land for oil.  
 
 
2.2  Chevron and local Dinka and Nuer 
Chevron mainly operated in the bush, paid compensation to people negatively 
affected by oil activities, and provided jobs to the local Dinka and Nuer eager to 
work.  Nonetheless, some people were irritated by the fact that it did not fully consult 
with local people. 
The local leader of the Nuer from Unity State in Malakal, Omda Makwac, explained 
the coming of Chevron people to his homeland: 
 
“People came from the North to look for oil in our land during Nimeiri’s time 
in power.  Oil activities started in 1980 and went on up to 1984.   They came 
to Ler, and then to Benet, Mankien and later to Rik.  They never came to the 
town itself but operated in the khalla [bush].  These foreigners were white men 
and jallaba [Northerners].  There were no Southerners amongst them.  It was 
good to know that we had oil but the white men and jallaba were taking it 
away.  That time we did not fully understand what was happening. We had few 
educated people.  Now we have many people with education.  If strangers 
come to our land, they will be asked about their intentions.”12  
 
 
The taking of land and destruction of property by Chevron caused resentment, 
however.  Apparently, the payment of compensation avoided the outbreak of 
organized dissent.  A Nuer teacher in Malakal explained the stance of the local people 
toward the destruction of property: 
 
“They were destroying homes and luaks [cattle byres].  I know of the 
destruction of luaks in Kuol Nak and Kwach in Eastern Jikany Nuer land.  
                                                 
 
10
 „Sudan:Two New Discoveries in Southwest Sudan‟, Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.25, No.26, 
12 April 1982, p.6. 
11
 A map showing oil concessions is accessible from the website of the European Coalition on Oil in 
Sudan. http://www.ecosonline.org. 
12
 Interview with Omda Makwac in Malakal on 12 August 2006. 
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People could not resist.  How could we resist?  The path or road would be 
constructed up to the edge of the homestead.  Then they would tell the people 
that they needed to destroy the houses within it and that the people should take 
money as compensation.  We had to take the money offered and relocate to 
other places.”13 
 
 
Most people, however, insisted that Chevron activities were beneficial for local 
people.  For example, a Dok Nuer from Ler County narrated a popular story about a 
Chevron surveyor and a Nuer man called Kuiwok: 
 
“A Chevron surveyor found oil under Kiuwok’s luak.  He asked Kiuwok, if 
something valuable is found fi sika sakit bi nadi sunu? [on road and belonged 
to one, what was it called?]  Kiuwok replied that in Nuer such a thing would 
be called bang.  The Chevron people renamed the place bang.  Then the 
surveyor told Kiuwok that there was oil under his luak and he should tell the 
value of his property.  Kiuwok said it was worth three million Sudanese 
pounds.  Chevron paid the three million and an additional two million, 
totalling five million.  Kiuwok used two million to buy cattle, one million to 
buy a house, and the rest he put aside for his children.  He was very happy to 
leave his old luak.”14 
 
 
Bang became part of the present Block 5A, opened up for intensive oil development 
by a consortium led by the Swedish oil company Lundin Oil AB, which established 
its field base at Thar Jath.  
 
Some local people particularly appreciated the fact that the Chevron workers did not 
interfere with traditional ritual sites, which the local people wanted to be preserved. 
Chabbany, a Dinka from Pariang, had this to say about Chevron workers who came to 
his village: 
 
“Chevron wanted to make a line/path through our shrine, which was situated 
close to the luak.  They told our elders to either relocate or destroy the shrine 
and take money as compensation for the damage.  Our elders rejected the 
demand of the oil workers.  The Chevron people heeded the view of our elders 
and, instead, made the line/path to pass in a different location.  This happened 
in 1982.”15 
 
 
Local people also benefited from employment opportunities.  For example, a group of 
Eastern Jikany Nuer men, whom I met in Malakal, told me that young men from their 
villages worked with Chevron and used their income to acquire cattle.   
 
While Chevron and the local people were generally enjoying peaceful relations, 
President Jaafar Nimeiri's ties with Southern elites were deteriorating.  Nimeiri sought 
                                                 
 
13
 Interview with Nuer teacher in Malakal on 5 February 2006. 
14
 Interview with Dok Nuer man in Bentiu on 23 August 2006. 
15
 Interview with Chabbany in Malakal on 10 June 2006. 
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to control the development of oil resources.  Southern elites opposed this.  Chevron 
sided with Nimeiri, raising the ire of the Southerners.
16
  
 
 
2.3  Oil Disputes 
The most serious disputes between President Nimeiri and Southern elites were over 
naming of oil wells and oil areas in the South, transparency in oil matters, the North-
South border, and the location of a proposed oil refinery.  This scramble over oil 
played a major role in the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983.  
 
 
2.3.1  Renaming of Oil Areas 
 
Southerners wondered why „wells in Southern region [were] baptized with political 
names, such as “Unity Wells” and “Unity Field”, while those in the North carried 
local names‟.17  Many of them saw the selection of political names by leaders in the 
North as intended to undermine their control of oil areas in the South.  A related 
disagreement concerned a proposal to create “Unity Region” - comprising Bentiu and 
Gogrial Area Councils from the South, and Abyei, Fulla, Kadugli and Dilling Area 
Councils in Southern Kordofan - to be controlled by the office of the presidency.
18
  
Southerners perceived this as a cynical attempt to remove oil-rich Southern areas from 
the control of the regional government in Juba, and opposed it strenuously.  
 
Ultimately, Nimeiri decreed a new province called Al Wihda (Unity), and appointed 
himself as the governor of the „oil province‟.  By so doing, he ensured „the exclusion 
of Southern politicians and administrators from overseeing the oil industry; it had now 
become the special preserve of the president‟.19  
 
 
2.3.2  Secrecy and Ambiguity 
 
According to Peter Nyuot Kok, oil policy was formulated by a small group of elites 
„comprising the President, a few palace aides, the Minister of Energy and Mining, 
Chevron and a few expatriate mediators‟.20  Southern marginalization from oil matters 
was complicated by the vagueness of the Addis Ababa Agreement on economic 
                                                 
 
16
 Alier, Abel, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured 2
nd
 Edition, (Reading, Ithaca 
Press, 1992). 
17
 Taban, Afred Logune, „Where and How Much is the Oil?‟, Southern Sudan Magazine, Vol.4, No.3, 
1980, p. 24. 
18
 Alier, Abel, Southern Sudan: Many Agreements Dishonoured, (Exeter, Ithaca, 1990), p.216.  
19
 Khalid, Mansour, War and Peace in Sudan: A Tale of Two Countries, (London, Kegan Paul 
International, 2003), p. 147. 
20
 Kok, Peter Nyuot, „Adding Fuel to the Conflict: Oil, War and Peace in the Sudan‟, in Doornbos, M., 
Cliffe, L., Ahmed, A.G.M. and Markakis, J. (eds.) Beyond Conflict in the Horn: The Prospects for 
Peace, Recovery & Development in Ethiopia, Somalia, Eriteria & Sudan, (The Hague, The Institute of 
Social Studies, 1992), p.109. 
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allocations between the South and the North.
21
  This loophole facilitated the intention 
of Nimeiri to monopolise oil activities.
22
   
 
Southerners were also irritated with the central government elites and the mass media 
in Khartoum for repeatedly making dubious statements about the location of oil. 
Official statements and media reports repeatedly claimed that Unity 1, 2, and so forth 
were situated 450 miles southwest of Khartoum, and avoided mentioning that these 
locations were in Bentiu district.  Instead of allaying the rising fears in the South, 
however, officials in the Ministry of Energy and Mining claimed that the complaints 
were unjustified since „oil was a national commodity and would be used for the 
benefit of the whole country‟.23   
 
 
2.3.3  North-South Border 
 
In December 1980, the Sudanese National Assembly passed a decentralization bill 
that included a map indicating „obvious and even deliberate encroachment upon the 
territories that were ostensibly part of Southern Sudan‟.24  The territories slated for 
excision from the South and inclusion in the North comprised the copper- and 
uranium-rich area of Hufrat El Nahas, the oil-rich area of Bentiu, and the fertile area 
of Renk.   
 
Hufrat El Nahas was annexed to Darfur in 1961 by President Ibrahim Aboud (1958-
1964), who was engaged in a bloody confrontation with the secessionist Anyanya 
rebel group in the south of the country, when uranium was discovered in the area.
25
  
After the war ended in 1972, however, the area was returned to Southern Sudan as 
part of the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement.  At the end of 1979, 
President Nimeiri secretly leased the area to Chevron for oil exploration.
26
  The 1980 
decentralization bill removed the area from the South and made it part of Southern 
Darfur.  Many Southerners opposed the attempts to shift the border southwards, 
compelling Nimeiri to decree that the North-South border should remain as it was at 
independence on 1 January 1956.     
 
Southerners were also annoyed with Nimeiri for continuing to keep Abyei - another 
contested area in the North-South border region - in the North.  In 1905, British 
colonial administrators transferred the administration of the nine Ngok Dinka 
chiefdoms in Abyei from Bahr al Ghazal Province to Kordofan Province in the North.  
According to the Regional Self-Government Act of 1972, „Southern Provinces of the 
                                                 
 
21
 Dallalah, Salwa K., „Foreign Capital in the Petroleum Sector: The Case of Chevron Sudan‟, Thesis 
for M.A., (Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 1985). 
22
 Article 11 of the Addis Ababa Agreement entitles the Regional Assembly to legislate on, among 
other things, „Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the 
event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals.‟ 
23
 Taban, Afred Logune, „Where and How Much is the Oil?‟, Southern Sudan Magazine, Vol.4, No.3, 
1980, p.24. 
24
 Badal, Rafael K., „Oil and Regional Sentiment in the South,‟ in Abd Al-Rahim, M., Badal, R.K., 
Hardallo, A. and Woodward, P. (eds) Sudan Since Independence, Aldershot, (Grower Publishing 
Company, 1986), p.144. 
25
 Alier, Abel, Southern Sudan: Many Agreements Dishonoured, p.101. 
26
 Alier, Abel, Southern Sudan: Many Agreements Dishonoured 2
nd
 Edition,  p.238.  
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Sudan means the Provinces of Bahr al Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in 
accordance with their boundaries as they stood on 1 January 1956, and any other areas 
that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern complex, as may be 
decided by a referendum‟.27  Hence, the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms were supposed to 
decide in a referendum to rejoin fellow Dinka in Bahr al Ghazal or remain in Southern 
Kordofan.  This did not happen, and the Dinka of Abyei remained in the North. 
 
 
2.3.4  Oil Refinery 
 
Against the wishes of Southerners, Nimeiri informed the National Assembly on 10 
November 1980 that a refinery would be constructed in Kosti.
28
   Work on the 
refinery was expected to begin in March 1981 and be completed at the end of 1984.   
In August 1981, the government, the World Bank and Chevron set up the White Nile 
Petroleum Company (WNPC) to manage the proposed refinery.
29
  
 
The Minister of Energy and Mining, Al Tuhami, claimed that „Kosti had been 
selected as the refinery site in view of scientific, technical, and economic factors‟.30  
Chevron officials also preferred Kosti for the same reasons.  Kosti was well served by 
rail, road and river transportation; and well connected to productive areas in central 
Sudan, where major industries such as Hajar Assalaya and Kenana sugar factories 
were based.
31
  Bentiu did not have the same significance as Kosti and was dismissed 
as being situated „in the middle of nowhere‟.32   
 
Southern leaders argued that the refinery should be situated in Bentiu precisely 
because it was so underdeveloped.
33
  „Chevron would be required to build roads, 
schools, hospitals; employment would be generated in the depressed area; and the 
royalties and/or taxes would help free the South from dependence on Northern 
budgetary support‟.34  Nimeiri ignored these arguments and resolved to have the 
refinery built in Kosti.
35
  Abel Alier, the then leader of the autonomous Southern 
region, was left in the unenviable position of selling the decision that Sudanow 
dubbed as „[a] bitter pill for the South.‟36   
 
As disputes over oil development continued, the security in the South worsened.  
Well-armed rebels attacked vehicles and government positions, inviting reprisals by 
government forces mostly against civilians.  The violence bred mayhem in some parts 
of Upper Nile.  For example, the oil-rich Bentiu district was being compared to Beirut 
                                                 
 
27
 Chapter II, Article 3 (iii) of the Regional Self-Government Act of 1972.  
28
 Taban, Afred Logune, 'Fuelling Development? Oil: Troubled Waters,' Sudanow Vol.6, No.6, June 
1981, p.17 
29
 Phillips, Jeffery, 'Oil and Minerals Seminar: Sovereignty with Business,' SudanowVol.6, No.12, 
December 1981, p.19. 
30
 Taban, Afred Logune, 'Fuelling Development? Oil: Troubled Waters,' p.18.  
31
 Phillips, Jeffery, 'New Refinery: On Troubled Waters,' Sudanow, Vol.6, No.6,  January 1981, p.33. 
32
 Phillips, Jeffery, 'Oil and Mineral Seminar: Sovereignty with Business,' 1981, p.19. 
33
 Dallalah, Salwa K., 'Foreign Capital in the Petroleum Sector: The Case of Chevron Sudan,' p.84. 
34
 Taban, Alfred Logune, 'Fuelling Development? Oil: Troubled Waters,' p.19.  
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Madut, Arop, 'Kosti Refinery: A Bitter Pill for the South,' Sudanow Vol.6, No.7, July 1981, p.22. 
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and Vietnam by 1983.
37
   In order to contain this rising opposition, Nimeiri decreed 
the re-division of the South into three regions in June 1983, which effectively 
abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement. Shortly after, the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/Army was founded.  In September of the same year, Nimeiri imposed 
shari’a law on the country.  The action compelled more Southerners to join the 
SPLM/A.  Without doubt, contest over oil development between central government 
elites and Southerners had a big role in the return to war in 1983.  
 
 
3.  Wartime Oil Activities and Mass Displacement 
 
The first attacks by the SPLA were directed at the oil and Jonglei Canal projects, 
which were brought to a standstill in 1984.  During the Omer al Bashir regime (1989 - 
present), serious oil development resumed, culminating in the export of oil for the 
first time in 1999.  Oil revenues were a blessing to the regime, but a curse to the 
civilians in the oil areas.  Most of them were killed or forced to flee to Northern 
Sudan and other areas.    
 
 
3.1  Chevron attacked and forced out 
In 1983, Chevron was producing an estimated 35,000 barrels per day from the Unity 
field and another 15,000 from Heglig; it was also planning to build a pipeline from the 
Unity field to Port Sudan.
38
  The pipeline was expected to begin carrying 50,000 
barrels per day in 1986, earning $250 million annually in much needed hard 
currency.
39
  However, violence thwarted the fulfilment of this hope. 
 
The anger fuelled by the development of oil, as well as the digging of the Jonglei 
Canal, initially focused on the workers of Chevron and Compagnie de Constructiones 
Internationales (CCI), as a report by a special correspondent of the Middle East 
Research and Information Project (MERIP) made clear: 
 
“On November 15, 1983, guerillas ambushed a Chevron camp near Bentiu 
and took two British workers hostage for two days.  The same month, nine 
CCI hostages were held for three days and digging on Jonglei, already two-
thirds complete, was suspended.  In December, an American Chevron 
employee was shot and killed.  During the first week of February, some 20 
guerrillas launched an armed assault on Chevron’s main camp at Rubkona, 
near Bentiu, killing a Briton, a Kenyan and a Filipino, and critically 
wounding seven other people.  Chevron shut down all operations in the 
South.”40  
 
                                                 
 
37
 Johnson, Douglas. H. and Prunier, Gerald, „The Founding and Expansion of the Sudan People's 
Liberation Army‟, 117-141 in Daly, Martin W. and Sikainga Ahmad Alawad (eds.) Civil War in the 
Sudan, (London, British Academic Press, 1993).  
38
 Burr, J. Millard and Collins, Robert. O., Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamist 
State 1989-2000, (Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2003), p. 223 
39
 „Report from the South: Khartoum's Greatest Challenge‟, Middle East Research and Information 
Project, Vol.135, September 1985, p. 11. 
40
 „Report from the South: Khartoum's Greatest Challenge‟, p. 13 
 - 9 - 
 
Nimeiri was humiliated, and turned to the Saudi Arabian arms dealer Adnan 
Khassoghi so as to put pressure on Chevron to resume work.  In December 1984, 
Khashoggi‟s Triad Holding Corporation of Saudi Arabia announced „that it had 
entered into an agreement with the Sudanese government for the formation of a 50-50 
venture – The National Oil Company of Sudan – to finance and develop Sudanese oil 
and gas reserves‟.41  The new company had the right to acquire „oil or oil related 
assets held by 3
rd
 parties, such as Chevron, if the president decrees that contract under 
which the assets were acquired [was] not being fulfilled‟.42  Moreover, Nimeiri had a 
secret deal with Khassoghi concerning arming and training militias to counter the 
SPLA.
43
  In October, Nimeiri had won over the Anyanya II militiamen led by William 
Abdallah Chuol with the promises of a cease-fire and political settlement.
44
  Chevron 
agreed to resume oil development on 1 January of the following year.
45
  
 
Nimeiri also recruited Arab nomads to help secure the oil areas, with some financial 
support from Chevron.
46
  In the 1970s and 1980s, the expansion of mechanised 
farming in central Sudan forced the nomads to seek permanent grazing lands in the 
areas inhabited by the Dinka along the North-South border.
47
  The nomads surrounded 
the oilfields in 1984 and displaced a large part of the local population.
48
  
 
Paradoxically, the escalation of violence worked against the Nimeiri regime as more 
Southerners joined the SPLA.  Moreover, the huge cost of waging the war - estimated 
at US$400,000 a day - had negative repercussions for the economy, turning more 
people against the regime.
49
  On 6 April 1985, the regime was ended by a civilian 
demonstration, supported by the army.  The new regime, led by Major General Abdul 
Rahman Sawar-Dahab, also became bogged down in fighting. Nonetheless, in April 
1986, it organized polls for the National Assembly which Sadiq al Mahdi‟s Umma 
Party won.  In June, Sadiq was elected prime minister.  Surprisingly, he intensified the 
arming and training of the Arab nomads responsible for some of the worst atrocities in 
the oil areas. 
 
Sadiq‟s government encountered even tougher economic predicaments as it lacked the 
level of support the US lavished on Nimeiri.  In 1987, according to Millard Burr and 
Robert Collins, „Sudan‟s foreign debts were enormous; annual payments amounted to 
$800 million, an obligation it could not possibly meet‟.50  The only way out of the 
economic quagmire was to force Chevron and other oil companies to restart oil 
                                                 
 
41
  „Sudan under Martial Law‟, Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.27, No.30, 7 May 1984, p. A10. 
42
 Dallalah, Salwa K., „Foreign Capital in the Petroleum Sector: The Case of Chevron Sudan‟, p. 91. 
43
 Scroggins, Deborah, Emma's War: Love, Betrayal, and Death in the Sudan, (London, HarperCollins, 
2002), p.88, 
44
 De Waal, Alex, „Some Comments on Militias in the Contemporary Sudan‟, in Daly, M.W. and 
Sikainga Ahmad Alawad (eds.) Civil War in Sudan, (London, British Academic Press, 1993),  p.152 
45
 „Chevron and Snam Progetti Plan to Resume Operations in Sudan‟, Middle East Economic Survey, 
Vol.28, No.6, 19 November 1984, p. A6. 
46
 Scroggins, Deborah, Emma's War: Love, Betrayal, and Death in the Sudan, p. 88.  
47
 Keen, David, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southern Sudan 
1983-89, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994), p.100. 
48
 Field, S.L., „The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry‟, IUD Occasional Paper, 
(Braamfontein, South Africa, 2002), p. 20 
49
 „Report from the South: Khartoum's Greatest Challenge‟, p. 11. 
50
 Burr, J. Millard and Collins, Robert O., Requiem for Sudan: War, Drought & Disaster Relief on the 
Nile, (Boulder, Westview, 1985), p. 87.  
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development.  Adam Mousa Madibu, the Minister of Energy and Mining, announced 
in October that the government would review concession agreements the former 
regime had concluded with Chevron, Shell, Sun Oil and Total - all of which he 
claimed were not carrying out any exploration work.
51
  At the end October 1987, 
Madibu declared that Chevron had agreed to resume operations in January of the 
coming year.
52
  
 
Sadiq‟s cousin, Mubarak al Mahdi, who later became the Minister of Energy and 
Mining, insisted that the military threat against Chevron no longer existed, for the 
Anyanya II rebels under the command of William Abdallah Chuol were already on 
the government side.
53
  William Abdallah Chuol died in fighting with the SPLA in 
1986.  His successor Gordon Kong joined the SPLA in 1988, taking along with him 
70 percent of the Anyanya II fighters.
54
  This defection dealt a blow to Sadiq‟s efforts 
to recruit tribal militias.  Only the rump of Anyanya II, led by Paulino Matip, 
remained on the government side.
55
   
 
With his hopes of restarting oil development frustrated, Sadiq‟s position was 
weakened.  In June 1989, he was thrown out of power by a coup masterminded by the 
fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF). Omer al Bashir, the coup leader, was 
born in 1945 in a Ja‟aliyin family.  He attended the Sudan Military Academy with the 
assistance of the NIF, and also studied at the Malaysia Military Institute.
56
  His rule 
was characterized by a renewed zeal to prosecute the war.  The army and militias 
were given free rein to kill and commit other egregious abuses.  However, the 
possibilities of resuming serious oil development remained elusive until the SPLM/A 
suffered a schism in 1991, when Riek Machar and Lam Akol tried to oust John 
Garang from the leadership of the insurgency.  They later formed factions that the 
government co-opted in 1997 through a short-lived peace agreement.   
 
 
3.2  Oil flow  
While containing the threat posed by the SPLA, Bashir was lining up companies to 
resume serious oil development.  First, Chevron was eased out in 1992; second, small-
sized Canadian and European companies were lured to participate in the oil project, 
but had to leave mainly because of an international outcry about human rights abuses; 
and thirdly, state-owned Chinese, Malaysian and Indian companies took control of the 
oil business.  The following table shows the key companies that got involved in 
Sudan's oil sector. 
 
 
                                                 
 
51
 „Sudan to Review Oil Agreements with Foreign Firms‟, Middle East Economic Survey, Vol.30, 
No.2, 15 September 1986, p. A7. 
52
 „Sun Oil and Chevron to Resume Exploration Activities in the Sudan‟, Middle East Economic 
Survey, Vol.13, No.5, 9 November 1987, p. A8. 
53
 Anderson, G. Norman, Sudan in Crisis: The Failure of Democracy, (Gainesville, University Press of 
Florida, 1999), p.142. 
54
 Alier, Abel, Southern Sudan: Many Agreements Dishonoured, p. 254. 
55
 De Waal, Alex, „Some Comments on Militias in the Contemporary Sudan‟, p. 152. 
56
 Burr, J. Millard and Collins, Robert O. Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamist 
State 1989-2000, p. 3. 
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Major Oil Companies that became involved in Sudan 
 
China Petroleum National Company (CNPC) 1995 to present 
Petronas (Malaysia) 1995 to present 
ONGC Videsh  (India)  2003 to present 
Lundin Oil AB (Sweden) 2003 to present 
Sudapet (Sudan National Petroleum Corporation) 1997 to present 
Talisman (Canada)  1998 to 2003 
OMV (Austria) 1997 to 2003 
Arakis (Canada) 1994 to 1998 
Concorp (Sudan) 1992 
Chevron (USA) 1978 to 1992 
 
The Asian companies played a crucial role in enabling Sudan to export oil for the first 
time in 1999 and subsequently expand exports.  Oil revenues spurred an 
unprecedented economic recovery, as the figures in the following table illustrate.  For 
example, the GDP growth rate rose rapidly as oil production and exports expanded. 
 
 
Oil Industry Growth and its Impact on the Sudanese Economy (1999-2006) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Pop. (millions) 32.6 33.3 34.0 34.7 35.4 36.1 36.8 37.7 
Oil production (thous. 
barrels p/d) 
68.6 187 209 232 262 288 287 364 
Oil export revenue 
(billions of US$) 
0.276 1.408 1.377 1.511 2.082 3.101 4.240 5.244 
Total exports (billions of 
US $) 
0.78 1.808 1.698 1.949 2.542 3.778 4.824 5.656 
Ratios of oil to total 
exports (%) 
35 77.8 81 77.5 80.1 82 87.8 92.7 
GDP (billions of US$)  10.6 12.3 13.3 14.9 17.7 21.7 27.9 37.4 
GDP growth (annual %) 3 8 6 5 7 5 9 12 
Foreign direct 
investments (bill. of $) 
0.37 0.39 0.57 0.71 1.34 1.51 2.30 3.53 
Sources: Central Bank of Sudan <www.bankofsudan.org>, IMF <www.imf.org>, and World 
Bank <www.worldbank.org>. 
 
The increase in oil revenues, however, meant that the regime had more money to 
spend on the army and militias.  The figures in the following table show vividly the 
significant increase in defence and security spending made possible by oil wealth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 12 - 
 
 
Expenditure on Sectors of the Sudanese Economy (1998-2006) 
 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total exports 
(billions of 
US $)  
0.5957 0.7801 1.808 1.698 1.949 2.577 3.778 4.824 5.656 
 Of which: 
Oil ($) 
00 0.276 1.408 1.377 1.511 2.082 3.101 4.240 5.244 
Current 
expenditure 
(billions of  
Sudan 
dinars) 
157.5 197.5 312.5 342.8 377 563.3 793.6 1,043.5 1,186.5 
Expend. 
defence & 
security  
52.2 108.5 151 100.4 127.6 103.9 320 283.8 235.5 
Expend. 
economic 
services 
5.8 9.9 9.7 12.7 7.6 12.7 273.3 301.1 -- 
Expend. 
social 
services 
23.2 32.8 32.4 36.4 32.7 20.8 27.1 32.7 -- 
Expend. loan 
repayments 
14.7 20.2 40.2 34.5 29.2 57.1 8.7 48.9 -- 
Expend. 
subnational 
govt. 
9.9 12.8 24.2 25 38.9 51.4 84.2 43.0 57.5 
Expend. 
Southern 
region 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 24.2 19.1 29.5 
Expend. 
Northern 
states 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 60.0 23.9 28.0 
Expend. 
others 
51.7 13.3 55 133.8 141 330.1 80.3 13.2 -- 
Expend. 
ratios of 
defence to 
current 
expend. (%) 
33.1 54.9 48.3 29.2 33.8 18.4 40 27.1 -- 
 
Sources: Central Bank of Sudan <www.bankofsudan.org>, IMF <www.imf.org>, and World 
Bank <www.worldbank.org>. 
 
 The well-supplied army and militias devastated many areas, forcing the local people 
to flee.  Some of the worst affected areas are Pariang, Heglig, and Rubkona in Unity 
State, and Melut in Upper Nile State.  
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3.2.1  Pariang  
 
Pariang County (Ruweng) is situated in the northeast of Unity State, and shares 
borders with Southern Kordofan State in Northern Sudan.  It is a part of Block 1.  
Before the outbreak of war, the local people, Panaru Dinka, generally had good 
relations with Arab nomads who graze their animals on their land during the dry 
season, or pass through their land to grazing areas along the Bahr al Ghazal River.  
The relationship between the two groups turned into a vicious one shortly after rebels 
attacked the Chevron base at Rubkona in February 1984. President Nimeiri used the 
Arab nomads to secure the oil areas.  The Arab nomads launched deadly attacks on 
Dinka villages with the support of the government army.  Pastor Mayuol explained 
the devastation of his home area in 1984: 
 
“The Arab nomads began shooting early one morning.  Our people fought 
with spears. 37 people were killed.  Then the army attacked our villages and 
killed more people.  The following day, the Arab nomads burnt our villages.  
Then my family embarked on a dangerous flight to Northern Sudan, and 
finally settled in Kenana Sugar Scheme.  The government planned the 
displacement of our people because of the oil in our land.  Chevron worked in 
our villages in 1982 but did not cause any harm.  But the companies which 
came in the 1990s inflicted much suffering on our people.”57 
 
Some of the displaced persons who remained in Pariang were rescued by SPLA 
forces, which reached Pariang in about 1986.  Riek Machar, a Dok Nuer from Ler, 
was the commander of the SPLA forces in Unity State.  These forces frustrated 
Chevron's hopes of resuming operations in Pariang. 
 
The government‟s hopes of restarting oil operations were boosted by the split in the 
SPLA in 1991, which had catastrophic consequences for the Dinka in Pariang.  They 
were considered natural allies of the SPLA faction led by John Garang, a Dinka from 
Bor, and came under sustained attack by Riek's faction.  A Panaru Dinka described 
the precarious situation of the Panaru Dinka in the wake of the SPLA split: 
 
“Life was very bad after the split.  Riek was responsible for the area.  He was 
the commander of the area of Pariang, which was under Mayom.  But our 
people were strong and resisted the Nuer.  We believed that once you were 
initiated you could not run away from your enemies.  We decided that we 
could not surrender to the followers of Riek.  They killed many of our 
people.”58 
 
 
Riek‟s forces and the government army protected oil companies, enabling them to 
resume work.  The 1,610-kilometre pipeline from the oilfields in Heglig to Port Sudan 
was completed in April 1999 but many local people were killed or forced to flee to 
other places.  For example, the UN rapporteur, appointed to monitor the situation of 
human rights in Sudan, learned that in May 1999, „in a 10-day offensive, government 
                                                 
 
57
 Interview with Pastor Mayuol in Malakal on 13 June 2006. 
58
 Interview with Panaru Dinka man in Malakal on 13 June 2006. 
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forces swept through Ruweng county in Western Upper Nile, attacking and killing 
scores of civilians with Antonov bombers, helicopter gunships, tanks and artillery, 
abducting hundreds and burning over 6,000 homes, with a view to clearing a 100-km 
swath of territory around the oilfields‟.59   The attacks escalated from late 2001 to 
early 2002.  As a result, Georgette Gagnon and John Ryle, who conducted an 
investigation in the area in 2001, were led to declare that „Ruweng County [was], 
perhaps, the clearest example in the whole of Upper Nile of deliberate forced 
expulsion of local people from their homes by government forces in order to secure an 
area for oil development'‟60  
 
 
3.2.2  Heglig 
 
The location of Heglig is contested by the government and Southern Sudanese alike, 
largely because of the oil reserves in the area.  In the 1980s, Chevron discovered a 
large oilfield in Heglig (later called Block 2).  The Dinka of Pariang insist that this 
area is their land, locally known as Aliny and renamed Heglig – from the Arabic name 
Igligi – by the government, so as to incorporate it into Northern Sudan.   
 
Since the 1980s, Heglig has witnessed intense violence by Arab nomads, government 
soldiers and local militias.  Oil companies were also to blame.  In 2000, a Southern 
geologist who conducted gravity data acquisition between Muglad and Abyei, 
described the eviction of the local population from Heglig: 
 
“I was based at a Chinese camp in Heglig, which was located close to the 
main camp of Talisman.  We (workers of the Chinese company) were guarded 
by Sudanese soldiers all the time.  Every time we went to the field to conduct 
exploration activities, the soldiers went ahead and shot into the bush with big 
guns to cause the natives to flee.  Then the soldiers informed the Chinese that 
it was safe.  We moved into the area and did the required work. In some 
places, we found deserted villages and burnt houses.  Also, we found human 
bodies in the exploration area and dead elephants.  The Chinese behaved like 
mercenaries, and never cared for the well-being of local people.”61 
 
 
Arab nomads allegedly settled in the depopulated area, with the support of the oil 
company Talisman, which developed water points, health facilities and schools.
62
  
Talisman came under intense criticism for facilitating government efforts to alter the 
demography of the area.  However, it claimed that the area had „never known 
permanent habitation, always being the scene of widespread flooding in the rainy 
season, and of cattle drives and nomad camps in the dry season‟.63  
                                                 
 
59
 Franco, Leonardo, Interim Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, (New York, UN 
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62
 Franco, Leonardo, Interim Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Sudan, (New York, UN 
General Assembly, 2000, A/55/374), p.3.  
63
 Harker, John, „Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Mission: Prepared for the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs‟, p. 47. 
 - 15 - 
 
Heglig suffered the worst violence in 1998 and 1999.  In May 1999, the Sudanese 
army burned down many villages on the eastern edge of Heglig, „causing the 
displacement of some 1,000 - 2,000 civilians‟.64  Air and ground forces employed 
scorched earth tactics „to clear oil-rich areas, chase people out of their villages and 
ensure that they would not return, including by planting anti-personnel landmines 
around watering points and along pathways to areas where wild food is available and 
in emptied villages‟.65  Georgette Gagnon and John Ryle said that the government 
increasingly used air power, in coordination with its ground troops and militias, to 
carry out more violent and territorially focused attacks on civilian settlements.
66
   
 
The SPLA had also become more aggressive in the oil area following the defection of 
the field commander of Paulino Matip‟s militia to its ranks in 1999.  For example, the 
SPLA announced that it had attacked the Heglig oilfields and brought oil flows to a 
complete halt in September 2001.
67
  The SPLA claimed that the reason for the attack 
was to bring about „a halt to development of the oil industry as oil exploration and 
development resulted in massive displacement of people‟.68  This attack was preceded 
by another significant SPLA assault on an oilfield close to Bentiu (Block 4) in 
January 2001.
69
  Many people were displaced by the intensified fighting and sought 
security in Bentiu and Rubkona. 
 
 
3.2.3  Rubkona 
Rubkona County is the seat of the Unity State government based at Bentiu town.  It is 
also a part of Unity 1 concession (Block 1). Rubkona is also a name of a town, 
situated about 7 km from Bentiu.  It gained significance after oil was discovered by 
Chevron. Talisman and Lundin Oil AB later used the location as their base.  
 
In 1999, relief organizations reported the population of the two towns as 15,622 and 
7,659 respectively.
70
  By 2002, the total number of displaced persons in Bentiu rose to 
51,142; and in Rubkona to 39,932.
71
  These displaced persons suffered grave abuses 
committed by local militia groups sustained by the government army.  Bentiu town 
was the stronghold of Paulino Matip's militia, and most of Rubkona was controlled by 
militiamen loyal to his rival, Riek Machar.  The two groups fought bloody battles over 
access to benefits from nearby oilfields, particularly Block 5A which was being 
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 Ibid. 
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developed by Lundin Oil AB.
72
  Many of the local people in Block 5A were killed or 
driven to other areas.
73
 
 
 
 
3.2.4  Melut 
Melut, one of the counties of Upper Nile State, is situated on the eastern banks of the 
White Nile.  It shares borders with Manyo County in the west, Renk in the north, 
Mabaan in the east, Longechuk in the southeast, and Baliet in southwest.  The local 
people are Dinka. 
 
Melut formed parts of Blocks 3 and 7.  Although Chevron found oil in the area in 
1981, serious oil development began when the Chinese National Petroleum Company 
(CNPC) acquired development rights in the area.  The CNPC, together with Petronas, 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, Sudapet and the Al Thani Corporation 
formed the Petrodar Operating Company (PDOC) in 2000.  The start of operations 
was announced in the following year.  
The government army and allied militias targeted local people, so that they would 
flee.
74
  The tactics used by the army in Melut were the same as those that applied in 
Unity State.  Unya, who worked with a Chinese company in Heglig from 1989 to 
1990 and in Paloich and Adar Yel from 2000 to 2003, makes this clear in his 
description of a typical day of work in Adar Yel: 
 
“After we [workers and army escorts] reached the place of work, the 
government soldiers and security fanned out into the bush such that the 
workers were encircled.  The soldiers went into the bush in trucks mounted 
with big guns and attacked villages.  Many civilians were often captured in 
these operations and brought to the muaskar [army base].   They were called 
qawarid [rebels].  Some of them were taken away to unknown places.  Even 
small children were taken from Adar Yel.”75  
 
 
According to Bishop Daniel Bul, 48 villages were set ablaze in Adar Yel in 2000, 
causing the displacement of 55,000 people.
76
  This violence was part of a broader 
government campaign, which began in 1996 and continued into 2004.  About 80 
Dinka villages were destroyed.  Bul concluded that the motive of the campaign was to 
secure oil concessions.  
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73
 Christian Aid, The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan, (London, Christian Aid, 2001).  
74
 Bul, Daniel Deng, „Oil Exploration and Exploitation in Northern Upper Nile: An Assessment of the 
long-Term Impact on the Area‟, (Renk, ECS Church, 2005). 
75
 Interview with Unya in Malakal on 20 June 2006. 
76
 Bul, Daniel Deng, „Oil Exploration and Exploitation in Northern Upper Nile: An Assessment of the 
long-Term Impact on the Area‟, p. 8. 
 - 17 - 
 
4.  Post-war Oil Activities and Ongoing Displacement 
 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) requires that the views of local 
communities on development of natural resources be considered.
77
  Instead, oil 
companies have expanded their operations and continued to pressure local people to 
leave their areas, and to make resettlement of displaced people difficult.  These 
problems are clearly illustrated by the experiences of the Dinka people in Paloich and 
Maker areas in Melut County and of the Shilluk people in Manyo County. 
  
 
4.1  Land Expropriation at Paloich 
Paloich used to be an insignificant location along the Melut-Malakal road.  The local 
people are Ageer Dinka.  During the war, the area was occupied by the government 
army and most of the local people fled to other areas.  After fighting ended, displaced 
people gradually returned to the area.  From July 2003, Petrodar Operating Company 
(PDOC), the operator of Blocks 3 and 7, pressured the residents of the Paloich town 
to leave the area.
78
  The Ministry of Energy and Mining and PDOC claimed that 
Paloich town was situated „above oil lakes‟.79  The inhabitants of the town were asked 
to relocate to a village located about five miles south of the town, but they refused.   
 
The failure of the relocation was to be expected, for PDOC had not changed the way 
it conducted business.  Indeed, the company continued to expropriate land with no 
compensation.  For example, local people complained that 600 farms had been taken 
by oil companies in the Paloich area since peace returned.
80
  PDOC failed to involve 
the local people in decisions pertaining to land, which contravened the CPA.  
 
 
4.2   Property Destruction at Maker and Manyo 
The signing of the CPA marked a surge in seismic activity, putting strain on local 
communities.  For example, the Dinka people of Maker, a small village on the banks 
of Khor Adar River in Melut County, and the Shilluk population of Manyo County 
suffered significant losses because of seismic activity. 
 
Maker was under the SPLA during the war and hence out of reach of oil companies.  
Since fighting ended, PDOC extended the oil search to the outskirts of the village, 
triggering fear among local people.  PDOC caused even more difficulties for the 
inhabitants of Manyo, a county separated from Melut by the Nile.  The PDOC 
workers arrived in Manyo in March 2006 and began making many seismic lines, 
which destroyed acacia trees, the source of gum Arabic, and a few homes.  The oil 
workers reportedly recorded the damaged trees, destroyed homes and other losses and 
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promised to pay compensation.  However, the promise was not fulfilled.  The local 
people were left reeling with bitterness against the oil company.   
 
 
 
4.3  Worsening North-South Border Disputes 
The central government has continued to stealthily shift the border southwards in 
locations where there is oil, fuelling a scramble over the border areas.  In certain 
areas, the scramble exploded into violence.  For example, Abyei town was engulfed in 
a fierce fighting between SPLA and the army in May this year, displacing tens of 
thousands of the local Dinka. 
 
Also oil-rich Heglig, where settlement of Arab nomads and displacement of the local 
Dinka have been actively pursued by the central government, has witnessed serious 
tensions.  The Dinka people claim Heglig as part of their traditional homeland but 
central government elites allege that it is part of the North.  By claiming that Heglig is 
located in the North, the central government elites deny the South a share of revenues 
from oil pumped out of the huge Heglig oilfield.  
 
Kharasana, a small trading post not far from Heglig, from which oil companies collect 
soil and gravels for roadwork, has also witnessed tense confrontation.  During the 
war, Southern Kordofan State collected taxes from this location.  With return of 
peace, the SPLA-led administration of Pariang County, Unity State, posted 
administrators to the location to collect taxes from oil companies.  This created a 
dispute, which prompted the intervention of the central government.  According to 
Commissioner Mabek, the central government ordered all administrators to leave the 
location.  The administration in Pariang complied with the order but Southern 
Kordofan State did not. Pariang then decided to send back its administrators to 
Kharasana.  The tension has simmered on, exploding into sporadic fighting.  For 
example, in 2008, heavily armed Arab tribesmen attacked SPLA positions, and early 
this year assaulted Dinka civilians.
81
    
 
No doubt, the presence of oil in the North-South border areas has spawned serious 
conflicts, which have been exploited by leaders in the central government who are 
determined to maintain control over all oil areas.  
 
 
4.4  Environmental Pollution 
The local people in the oil areas have been complaining about unexplained deaths of 
animals and new human afflictions. Commissioner Mabek of Pariang County, for 
example, claims that animals in his county have been dying of mysterious diseases 
and a number of people are falling ill with heart problems, which used to be unknown 
before the arrival of oil companies. 
 
The Ministry of Energy and Mining insists that the government is aware of the 
environmental problems associated with the oil sector and has adopted laws to deal 
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with potential problems.
82
  Furthermore, it claims that regulations regarding 
environmental protection have been incorporated into oil exploration, production and 
refining contracts and agreements.
83
  Unfortunately, the contracts are secret.  
 
However, investigations by the committees in the National Assembly and Southern 
Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) have cast doubts about the accuracy of the 
claims of the Ministry of Energy and Mining.
84
  These committees found significant 
environmental problems caused by unsafe dumping of water, mud and other wastes in 
the open.  According to an ecologist, who conducted an environmental assessment in 
Heglig, „produced water requires careful management because it contains harmful 
chemicals.  Unfortunately, safety standards are not complied with because of the 
rampant corruption.‟ 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The discovery of oil in Southern Sudan, at a time the region was recovering from 17 
years of war, by Chevron Oil Company was both a curse and a blessing to the 
country.  It played a big role in the return to war in 1983, and the subsequent 
displacement of most of the inhabitants of the oil areas.  But it was also behind the 
recent spectacular economic recovery, which could help underpin the CPA reached by 
the SPLM/A and the government in 2005.    
 
However, most of the benefits of oil development are as yet reaped by the politically 
dominant “Arab” and Muslim elites and their supporters in the central and northern 
parts of Sudan.  The long marginalized Sudanese in the other parts of the country have 
not benefited significantly, if at all, from oil development.  Instead, displacement 
linked to oil development remains a problem for some marginalized Sudanese, in 
particular the local people in the oil areas.  
 
Although mass displacement of civilians from the oil areas was ended by the CPA, 
subtle displacement continues.  Oil companies have rapidly expanded oil activities in 
„peacetime‟, pressuring some people to leave their ancestral homelands with no 
compensation.   Moreover, the burgeoning oil infrastructure has caused environmental 
problems, which disrupted livelihoods of some local people and hence generated more 
grievances against the government and oil companies.  The grievances will likely 
worsen if the politically dominant elites and oil companies continue to ignore local 
interests in oil development, which is supposedly carried out in the „national interest‟.  
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